University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 9
Number 2 Spring 1979

Article 6

1979

S.S.I. Recipients Forfeit Benefits When Traveling
Abroad
J. Michael Dougherty Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dougherty, J. Michael Jr. (1979) "S.S.I. Recipients Forfeit Benefits When Traveling Abroad," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 9:
No. 2, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol9/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

judicial or executive proceedings result in reinstatement of the presumption of his innocence or until he is
reelected to the House after the date of such
conviction.
This rule is inapplicable to a Member if the conviction is
overturned, the Member is pardoned, or is reelected to
the House after the conviction.

S.S.I. RECIPIENTS
FORFEIT BENEFITS
WHEN TRAVELING
ABROAD

III.

by J. Michael Dougherty, Jr.

PROCEDURE

The issue of expulsion involves a question of privilege
which supersedes the regular order of business, and
resolutions to expel are privileged (see House Rule IX;
Cannon's, supra, vol. VI, sec. 236; and Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, vol. II, sec. 2648).
Debate is under the hour rule. A Member may be heard
in his own defense or to present a written defense, but
not to appoint another Member to speak on his behalf
(Hinds, supra, vol. II, 1273).
A resolution relating to expulsion can be of two types:
(1) a resolution to expel forthwith upon adoption by twothirds of those present and voting, or (2) a resolution
directing either a standing committee (i.e., Committee
on Standards of Official Conduct) or a special (select)
committee to investigate and recommend. Such an
investigating committee may be granted subpoena
power and may examine witnesses under oath.

IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXPULSION

The authority of the House of Representatives to censure a Member is derived from Art. I, sec. 5. cl. 2 of the
U.S. Constitution, as quoted earlier. The grounds underlying the consideration of a resolution to censure a Member are based on (1) a breach of the rights of the House
collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings; and (2) a breach of the rights, reputation, and
conduct of Members, individually, in their representative
capacity only (Cannon's Procedure in the House of
Representatives, House Doc. 610, 87th Cong., p. 284;
and see House Rule IX). Between expulsion and censure, censure is the milder of the two, requiring a simple
majority vote (of those present and voting).
In recent times the House has resorted to less stringent methods of punishing its Members for their improprieties, when it did not conclude that expulsion or
censure was appropriate. Such alternative methods
include suspension of a Member's right to vote under
House Rule XLIII, cl. 10; imposition of fines; stripping of
committee chairmanships; reprimand, and rebuke by a
committee.
*Member of Virginia Bar. Former Assistant Director,
House Republican Research Committee

On December 11, 1978, in Califanov. Aznavorian, 99
S.Ct. 471 (1978), the Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of §1611(f) of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. §1382(f)). Though §1611(f)
denies benefits to Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
recipients for any month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the United States, the Court concluded that
the provision was not an impermissible burden on the
right of international travel as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.
On July 21, 1974, Grace Aznavorian, a United States
citizen and a recipient of SSI benefits,i left the United
States and traveled to Guadalajara, Mexico, where she
sought medical attention. Aznavorian remained in Mexico until September 1, 1974 due to an unexpected illness.
As a result of this sojourn, HEW denied Aznavorian SSI
benefits for the months of August and September pursuant to § 1611(f) of the Social Security Act. Section 1611
(f) provides that:
[N]o individual shall be considered an eligible individual for purposes of this Title for any month during all
of which such individual is outside the United States
...For purposes of the preceding sentence, after an
individual has been outside the United States for any
period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be treated as
remaining outside the United States until he has been
in the United States for a period of 30 consecutive
days.
After exhausting her administrative remedies,
Aznavorian filed a class action2 asserting that §1611(f)
denied her the Fifth Amendment guarantees of due process, equal protection and the right of international
travel.
The District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class.
To become eligible for benefits under the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program, a person must be a resident of the United
States, 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(1)(b); be over 65 years old or meet
statutory definitions of blindness and disability, 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a); and be poor, 42 U.S.C. §1382a (income), 42 U.S.C.
§1382b (resources). 99 S.Ct. at 472.
The class was limited to those who had presented unsuccessful
claims to the Secretary of HEW. Based on §1611(f), the Secretary
approximated that "between 4,823 and 9,195 persons were de
prived of their SSI benefits per month from February to October,
1976." Aznouorion v. Califuno, 440 F-Supp. 788, 793 (S.D.Cal.
1977).

FORUM

Although the court emphasized that "the right to travel
beyond the frontiers of the United States is a basic constitutional right," Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F.Supp.
788, 795 (S.D. Cal. 1977), the court conceded that the
right to travel abroad should not be placed on equal footing with the right to travel interstate. Id. at 796. The
district court noted that the governmental interest in restricting international travel must be legitimate and substantial and "cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the ends can
be more narrowly achieved." Id. at 797. In sum, §1611(f)
must bear a fair and substantial relationship to the governmental purposes that it seeks to achieve.
The Secretary alleged that the purpose of the statute

was to prevent fraudulent payments of SSI benefits to
nonresidents of the United States. The district court held
that since less drastic means 3 are available to prevent
fraudulent claims, the penalizing effect of § 1611(f) forces
recipients of SSI benefits to abandon their constitutional
right to travel. Thus, §1611(f) failed to bear a fair and substantial relationship to the governmental purpose sought
to be achieved.
The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme
Court, which reversed the district court in an opinion by
Justice Stewart.
The Supreme Court quickly discarded Aznavorian's
assertion that §1611(f) denied her equal protection and
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend
ment. Justice Stewart noted that social welfare legislation inherently creates sundry classifications of beneficiaries. However, if the classification is reasonable, "it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the
classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality.' " 99
S.Ct. at 474. The Court also emphasized that the Fifth
Amendment protects the freedom of international travel
and that such a right is "basic in our scheme of values"
and an important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty.' "Id. See
Kent u. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Aptheker v.Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). Concomitantly, the
Court rejected Aznavorian's assumption that the freedom of international travel is equivalent to the constitutional right to interstate travel.' While the "right of inter-

3

state travel has been considered to be no more than an
aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. . .Assuch, this 'right,'
the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of
due process." 99 S.Ct. at 475. Thus, different standards
will be utilized in judging the infringements on the right to
travel abroad and the right to interstate travel.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the constitutionality of §1611(f) does not depend on compelling justifications but on whether it is rationally based. The Court
concluded that §1611(f) was rationally based since the
provision assured that a beneficiary's residency in the
United States was genuine, limited payments to those
who need them in the United States and increased the
likelihood that the SSI payments would be spent inside
the United States. Therefore, since §1611(f) effectuates
the congressional decision to limit SSI payments to U.S.
residents, the incidental effect on the protected liberty of
international travel is a justifiable burden on the recip
ient's Fifth Amendment right to travel abroad.
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurred in the result and added
that he did not, however, "understand the Court to imply
that welfare legislation not involving a fundamental interest of suspect classification is subject to a lesser standard
of review than the traditional rational basis test." 99S. Ct.
at 476. Welfare legislation must be judged by a standard
that is not "toothless." Id.
In the case at bar, the Court reinforced the principal
that the right to travel abroad is not on equal par with the
right to travel interstate. While the right to travel interstate necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny
test, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394, U.S. 618, 638 (1969), the
right to international travel is not examined by such a
test. In light of the alternatives 5 suggested by the district
court, the fate of §1611(f) would have been sealed by the
strict scrutiny standard.

E.g., "42 U.S.C. §1383(e)(1)(B) (requiring verification of information received from an applicant/recipient); 42 U.S.C.§1382(e)(3)

(requiring the monitoring of all recipients); 42 U.S.C. §1383(b)
(requiring repayment to the program of overpayments received
by recipients); and 42 U.S.C. § 1383a (delineating penalties for various fraudulent acts leading to the wrongful receipt of benefits)."
Aznauorian v.Califano, 440 F.Supp. 788, 798 (S.D.Cal. 1977).
4 The constitutional right to travel interstate is not explicitly men
tioned in the Constitution. However, the right occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union and has long
been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. Shapiro
u. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969). See Boudin, the Constitutionol Rioht to Travel. 56 Col IIM L. RFV 47 (1956)
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